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Abstract
In this paper we present a formalisation of motivational attitudes, the attitudes that are the driving
forces behind the actions of agents. We consider the statics of these attitudes both at the assertion
level, i.e., ranging over propositions, and at the practition 2 level, i.e., ranging over actions, as well
as the dynamics of these attitudes, i.e., how they change over time. Starting from an agent’s wishes,
which form the primitive, most fundamental motivational attitude, we define its goals as induced by
those wishes that do not yet hold, i.e., are unfulfilled, but are within the agent’s practical possibility
to bring about, i.e., are implementable for the agent. Among these unfulfilled, implementable wishes
the agent selects those that qualify as its goals. Based on its knowledge on its goals and practical
possibilities, an agent may make certain commitments. In particular, an agent may commit itself to
actions that it knows to be correct and feasible to bring about some of its known goals. As soon as it no
longer knows its commitments to be useful, i.e., leading to fulfillment of some goal, and practically
possible, an agent is able to undo these commitments. Both the act of committing as well as that of
undoing commitments is modelled as a special model-transforming action in our framework, which
extends the usual state-transition paradigm of Propositional Dynamic Logic. In between making and
undoing commitments, an agent is committed to all the actions that are known to be identical for all
practical purposes to the ones in its agenda. By modifying the agent’s agenda during the execution
of actions in a straightforward way, it is ensured that commitments display an intuitively acceptable
behaviour with regard to composite actions. Ó 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The formalisation of rational agents is a topic of continuing interest in Artificial
Intelligence. Research on this subject has held the limelight ever since the pioneering work
of Moore [40] and Morgenstern [41,42] in which knowledge and actions are considered.
Over the years important contributions have been made on both informational attitudes like
knowledge and belief [20], and motivational attitudes like commitments and obligations
[9]. Recent developments include the Belief-Desire-Intention architecture [47], logics for
the specification and verification of multi-agent systems [62], and cognitive robotics [28].
In a series of papers [24,25,32–35,37] we defined a theorist logic for rational agents,
i.e., a formal system that may be used to specify, analyse and reason about the behaviour
of rational agents. In the basic framework [24,37], the knowledge, belief and abilities of
agents, as well as the opportunities for and the results of their actions are formalised. In
this so-called KARO framework it can for instance be modelled that an agent knows that
some action is correct to bring about some state of affairs since it knows that performing
the action will lead to the state of affairs, and that it knows that an action is feasible in the
sense that the agent knows of its ability to perform the action.
Having dealt with both informational attitudes and various aspects of action in previous
work, this paper is aimed at providing a formalisation of the motivational attitudes of
rational agents. In the last decade various formalisations of different kinds of motivational
attitudes have been proposed [9,46,55]. The approach presented in this paper makes three
main contributions to the theory of formalising motivational attitudes. Firstly, we consider a
fairly wide scope of motivational attitudes, situated at two different levels. At the assertion
level, this is the level where operators deal with assertions, we consider wishes and goals.
At the practition level, where operators range over actions, we define commitments. With
respect to these commitments we introduce both an operator modelling the commitments
that an agent has made, and an action which models the act of committing. The notions
that we formalise avoid (most of) the well-known problems that plague formalisations of
motivational attitudes. Secondly, our formalisation of the various notions is strictly bottom
up. That is, after defining the fundamental notion of wishes, goals are defined in terms
of wishes, and commitments are introduced using the notion of goals. In this way, we
provide a formalisation of motivational attitudes that does not have to resort to ‘tricks’ like
(circularly) defining the intention to do an action in terms of the goal to have done it. Lastly,
in our formalisation we will also try to connect to some relevant insights on motivational
attitudes as they have been gained in the philosophical research on practical reasoning, in
particular some ideas of the philosopher Von Wright [63].
We end this introduction with a disclaimer. In recent years it has become apparent that
in order to give a full treatment of intelligent agents (and especially their motivational
attitudes), one needs—besides a logical framework—elements from decision theory and/or
game theory, where utilities and preferences of goals, plans and courses of action are
studied. (The seminal work on this area is Von Neumann and Morgenstern [60]. References
to application to AI (and agent theory in particular) can be found in, e.g., [3,13,61].)
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Although we appreciate this fully, 3 we do not include these elements in our present
account, but indicate the places in our approach where they may play a role. Thus we
present a logical framework to describe motivational attitudes of agents, leaving ‘extra-
logical’ issues aside. 4 For instance, for selecting a wish (as a candidate goal) we will just
use a select ϕ operator that has as a result that ϕ has been selected. We do not give
criteria on the basis of which a rational agent will make this selection. Here, of course,
decision-theoretic approaches using utilities and preferences, may come in. We maintain
that if one would wish to incorporate these approaches in our framework, one might do so
by refining the model.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. To sketch the context and the area of
application of this research, we start in Section 2 with the (re)introduction of some of our
ideas on knowledge, belief, abilities, opportunities, and results; furthermore the definition
of our formal language is given. In Section 3 we discuss the motivational attitudes that
we will treat in this paper, and extend the basic language with extra operators to express
these attitudes. Next we turn to the semantics of our language: in Section 4 we present the
models of our basic framework, in Section 5 we consider the semantics of the operator for
expressing wishes and in Section 6 and Section 7 the notions of a goal and a commitment,
respectively, are treated formally. We will be able to formalise goals in such a way that
problems of ‘logical omniscience’ that plague most formalisations of motivational attitudes
are avoided. Finally, in Section 8 we summarise and conclude. Selected proofs are provided
in an appendix.
2. Knowledge, abilities, opportunities, and results
The main informational attitude that we consider is that of knowledge. In representing
knowledge we follow the approach common in epistemic logic [20,23]: the formula Kiϕ
denotes the fact that agent i knows ϕ, and is interpreted in a Kripke-style possible worlds
semantics. In our approach it is left open whether the knowledge of an agent results from
the agent’s explicitly having an encoding of this knowledge at its disposal (like, e.g., in
Konolige’s deduction model of belief [27]), or that knowledge is ascribed implicitly (or
even metaphorically) to the agent in terms of a relationship between the agent and its
environment (as in Rosenschein’s situated automata [50,51], in which an agent knows ϕ
in a situation where its internal state is σ if ϕ holds in all possible situations in which the
agent is in internal state σ ).
At the action level we consider results, abilities and opportunities. Slightly simplifying
ideas of Von Wright [63], we consider any aspect of the state of affairs brought about
by the execution of an action by an agent in some state to be among the results of the
event consisting of the execution of that particular action by that particular agent, in that
3 However, the role of decision theory in specifying the behaviour of intelligent agents should also not be
overestimated: as stated in, e.g. [5,18], it might be that sometimes the system in which the agent has to operate
is so dynamic and subject to change that elaborate decision-theoretic deliberation might be outdated when it is
finished and ready to be used.
4 We note that for instance Boutilier [3] attempts to give a logical account of this type of reasoning so that his
theory may be a good candidate for integrating these decision-theoretic aspects into our theory.
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particular state. An important aspect of any investigation of action is the relation that exists
between ability and opportunity. In order to successfully complete an action, both the
opportunity and the ability to perform the action are necessary. Although these notions
are interconnected, they are surely not identical: the abilities of agents comprise mental
and physical powers, moral capacities, and physical possibility, whereas the opportunity to
perform actions is best described by the notion of circumstantial possibility (cf. [26]). The
abilities of agents are formalised via the Ai operator; the formula Aiα denotes the fact that
agent i has the ability to do α. When using the descriptions of opportunities and results as
given above, the framework of (propositional) dynamic logic provides an excellent means
to formalise these notions. Using events doi (α) to refer to the performance of the action
α by the agent i , we consider the formulae 〈doi (α)〉ϕ and [doi (α)]ϕ. As we shall only
encounter deterministic actions in this paper, 〈doi (α)〉ϕ is the stronger of these formulae;
it represents the fact that agent i has the opportunity to do α and that doing α leads to
ϕ. The formula [doi (α)]ϕ is noncommittal about the opportunity of the agent to do α but
states that if the opportunity to do α is indeed present, doing α results in ϕ.
Definition 2.1. Let denumerable sets A = {1, . . . , n} of agents, Π of propositional
symbols and At of atomic actions be given. The language L is the smallest superset of
Π such that:
if ϕ,ψ ∈ L, i ∈A, α ∈Ac then ¬ϕ,ϕ ∨ψ,Kiϕ, 〈doi (α)〉ϕ,Aiα ∈ L
where Ac is the smallest superset of At such that if ϕ ∈ L, α,α1, α2 ∈Ac then
ϕ? ∈Ac tests
α1;α2 ∈Ac sequential composition
ifϕ then α1 else α2 fi ∈Ac conditional composition
while ϕ do α od ∈Ac repetitive composition
The intuitive interpretation of the ϕ? action is the verification whether ϕ holds: if
it does, execution can be continued with the next action; if it doesn’t, execution fails
(remains pending without yielding a next state). Actions that are either atomic or a test, are
called semi-atomic. The class of semi-atomic actions is denoted by At+. The sequential
composition α1;α2 is interpreted as α1 followed by α2. The conditional composition
if ϕ then α1 else α2 fi means the execution of α1 if ϕ holds and that of α2 otherwise.
The repetitive composition while ϕ do α od is interpreted as executing α as long as ϕ
holds. The formal semantics of these actions will be treated in the next section. The purely
propositional fragment of L is denoted by L0. Constructs ∧,→,↔,> and⊥ are defined in
the usual way, and [doi (α)]ϕ is used as an abbreviation of ¬〈doi (α)〉¬ϕ. Finally, we define
the class Acseq as the smallest superset of At+ closed under sequential composition. Thus
Acseq consists of sequences of semi-atomic actions.
2.1. The Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate
To formalise the knowledge of agents on their practical (im)possibilities, we introduced
the so-called Can-predicate and Cannot-predicate. These are binary predicates, pertaining
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to a pair consisting of an action and a proposition, and denoting that an agent knows that
performing the action constitutes a practical (im)possibility to bring about the proposition.
We consider practical possibility to consist of two parts, viz. correctness and feasibility:
action α is correct with respect to ϕ iff 〈doi (α)〉ϕ holds and α is feasible iff Aiα holds.
Definition 2.2. The Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate are, for all agents i , actions α
and formulae ϕ, defined as follows.
PracPossi (α,ϕ)
def= 〈doi (α)〉ϕ ∧Aiα,
Cani (α,ϕ)
def= KiPracPossi (α,ϕ),
Cannoti (α,ϕ)
def= Ki¬PracPossi (α,ϕ).
Thus the Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate express the agent’s knowledge about
its practical possibilities and impossibilities, respectively. Therefore these predicates are
important for the agent’s planning of actions. 5
3. Motivational attitudes: Wishes, goals and commitments
Motivational attitudes constitute what probably is the most fundamental, primitive and
essential characteristic of agency. These attitudes provide the motive for any act on
behalf of the agents, i.e., the acting of agents is driven by their motivational attitudes.
Typical examples of motivational attitudes are amongst others wishes, desires, concerns,
ambitions, goals, intentions and commitments. The meaning of most of these terms is
intuitively much less clear than that of the informational attitudes of knowledge and
belief, or of the aspects of action (result, opportunity, ability) that we considered in the
previous section. It is therefore also not clear which of the aforementioned motivational
attitudes are relevant, and worth formalising, when modelling rational agents. In their BDI-
architecture, Rao and Georgeff [47] consider desires and intentions to be primitive, and
define a notion of commitment in terms of these, Cohen and Levesque [9] consider goals
to be primitive and define intentions using goals, and Shoham [54] restricts himself to
formalising commitments.
Psychologically, it is rather doubtful whether notions such as goals, intentions and
commitments are indeed primitive. Contemporary psychology maintains that motivational
processes are stemming from (the interaction between) internal drives, such as hunger,
and external incentives, such as the availability of food, and are experienced by humans
subjectively as conscious desires (see, e.g., [2]). Thus, abstracting from the way how
these come about, wishes or desires seem to be a fundamental notion in explaining human
motivated behaviour. Of course, one may question the adequacy of psychological insights
for non-human, artificial agents. It is very dubious indeed whether a robot (and, a fortiori a
5 This Can-predicate is very closely related to similar notions in [40] and [42]. Both these notions also employ
the notion of a (physical) precondition, which in our framework is expressed by means of the result operator
in 〈doi (α)〉ϕ, while we have generalised the ability/know-how aspect in these notions by means of the ability
operator Ai .
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softbot) can be ascribed human motivational attitudes. However, since it is to be expected
that agent systems will consist of both artificial and human agents, and agent theories must
therefore be applicable to both agents, human and artificial, it seems reasonable to stay as
close in line with psychology as possible. In our approach we will therefore take wishes (or
desires) as primitive, and define goals by means of these, where we also make use of our
KARO framework to express the practical possibility of actions. Commitments are then
defined as the result of certain commit actions applied to actions that are known to fulfill
goals (and that can indeed be performed).
We claim that by proceeding in the above manner, in addition to being more in line
with ideas from contemporary psychology, we obtain a theory that is also close to insights
gained in analytical philosophy, especially those pertaining to the modelling of practical
reasoning. The term ‘practical reasoning’ dates back to Aristotle, and refers to the process
through which (human) agents conclude that they should perform certain actions in order
to bring about some of the things that they like to be the case. It seems very likely that for
autonomous agents in AI applications, which have to act (autonomously) to achieve some
of their goals, practical reasoning accounts for the most essential and most frequently used
kind of information processing. Hence an adequate formalisation of motivational attitudes
should pay at least some attention to this kind of reasoning.
A further important feature of our framework is that within it—being founded on a
theory of action—it is easy to incorporate the act of selecting: agents have to make choices
among the things they desire to be the case, thereby deciding which of these they will try to
achieve next. For it might be impossible to satisfy all of an agent’s wishes simultaneously,
since these wishes become easily either analytically inconsistent or incompatible given
the agent’s resources. More generally, we believe that basing motivational attitudes of
agents on a theory of action (like the KARO framework) provides a framework in which
dependencies between motivational notions can be expressed naturally. We also claim
that the use of an action-based theory yields direct connections with ‘programs’, so that
we can on the one hand profit from programming/computing theory while developing
our framework, and on the other obtain a theory that is closer to programming practice.
Interestingly, even if one does not share our views of the desirability of keeping our
theory as close to psychology and philosophy as possible, the approach thus leads to a
very pragmatic point of view. We will return to this issue later.
Thus the notions that will play an essential role in our formalisation are wishes, goals
and commitments. Of these, wishes constitute the primitive motivational attitude that
models the things that an agent likes to be the case. As such, wishes naturally range over
propositions, corresponding to the idea that agents wish for certain aspects of the world.
We formalise wishes through a normal modal operator, i.e., an operator validating just the
so-called K-axiom and the necessitation rule. Agents set their goals by selecting among
their wishes. However, agents are not allowed to select arbitrary wishes as their goals, but
instead may only select wishes that are unfulfilled yet implementable. Whenever an agent
knows that it has some goal, it may commit itself to any action that it knows to be correct
and feasible with respect to the goal. This act of committing to an action is itself formalised
as a special kind of action. Commitments to actions are in general to persist until all of the
goals for which the commitment was made are fulfilled. Having said so, agents should
not be forced to remain committed to actions that have either become useless in that they
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do not lead to fulfillment of any goal any more, or impossible in that the agent no longer
knows that it has the opportunity and ability to perform the action. Phrased differently, an
agent should be allowed to uncommit itself whenever an action is no longer known to be
correct and feasible with respect to one of the agent’s goals.
To formalise wishes, goals and commitments and their associated concepts, we intro-
duce a modal operator modelling wishes, operators modelling implementability, (made)
choices and (made) commitments, and action constructors modelling the acts of selecting,
committing and uncommitting.
Definition 3.1. To define the language LC, the alphabet is extended with the wish op-
erator W
_
_, the implementability operator ♦
_
_, the selected operator C
_
_, the commit-
ment operator Committed
_
_ and the action constructors select_, commit_to_ and
uncommit_.
The acts of committing and uncommitting are of an essentially different nature than the
regular actions, execution of which changes the state of the world. Through the former
actions agents (un)commit themselves to actions of the latter kind. Intuitively it does not
make much sense to allow agents to commit themselves to making commitments: it is not
at all clear how a statement like ‘i is committed to commit itself to do α’ is to be inter-
preted. Also statements like ‘it is implementable for agent i to become committed’ seem
to be of a rather questionable nature. To avoid these kinds of counterintuitive situations,
we define the language LC on top of the language L that we defined previously. That is,
the operators modelling wishes, implementability and selections are defined in such a way
that they range over formulae from L rather than those from LC. The operator modelling
the commitments that an agent has made is defined to range over the actions from Ac, the
class of actions associated with L, and not over AcC (to be defined below). Analogously,
the special actions in AcC, as there are the action modelling the act of selecting and those
modelling the making and undoing of commitments, take as arguments elements from L
and Ac rather than LC and AcC.
Definition 3.2. The language L and the class Ac of actions are as in Definition 2.1, i.e., L
is the smallest superset of Π closed under the core clauses of Definition 2.1 and Ac is the
smallest superset of At satisfying the core clauses of Definition 2.1 again.
The language LC is the smallest superset ofΠ such that the core clauses of Definition 2.1
are validated and furthermore
• if ϕ ∈ L and i ∈A then Wiϕ ∈ LC,
• if ϕ ∈ L and i ∈A then ♦iϕ ∈ LC,
• if ϕ ∈ L and i ∈A then Ciϕ ∈ LC,
• if α ∈Ac and i ∈A then Committediα ∈ LC.
The class AcC is the smallest superset of At closed under the core clauses of Definition 2.1
and such that
• if ϕ ∈ L then selectϕ ∈AcC,
• if α ∈Ac then commit_toα ∈AcC,
• if α ∈Ac then uncommitα ∈AcC.
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Definition 3.3. For i ∈ A, α ∈ AcC and ϕ ∈ LC, the abbreviations PracPossi (α,ϕ) and
Cani (α,ϕ) are defined as in the language L.
4. Semantics
As is usual for a modal language we use Kripke-style semantics. Essentially, our models
consist of a set of possible worlds, a truth assignment function for the propositional
symbols, and accessibility relations for the modal operators that we consider. For the core
language defined in Definition 2.1, this means that we need accessibility relations for the
knowledge operator and the operator 〈doi (α)〉. For technical convenience, we will use for
the latter a function rather than a relation. Finally, we need a function to indicate the agent’s
capabilities at each possible world.
Definition 4.1. The class M of models contains all M= 〈S,pi,R,r0,c0〉 where
• S is a set of possible worlds, or states.
• pi :Π × S→{0,1} assigns a truth value to propositional symbols in states.
• R : A→ ℘(S× S) is a function that yields the epistemic accessibility relations for a
given agent. It is demanded that R(i) is an equivalence relation for all i . We define
[s]R(i) to be {s′ ∈ S | (s, s′) ∈ R(i)}, the R(i)-equivalence class of s.
• r0 : A × At→ (S ∪ {∅})→ (S ∪ {∅}) is such that r0(i, a)(s) yields the (possibly
empty) state transition in s caused by the event doi (a). For technical reasons we
stipulate that always s /∈ r0(i, a)(s). This means that a successful performance of
an atomic action always results in a state transition to another state in the model. Of
course, it may happen that this state satisfies the same formulas as the original one. 6
• c0 : A × At→ (S ∪ {∅})→ {0,1} is the capability function such that c0(i, a)(s)
indicates whether the agent i is capable of performing the action a in s.
The notion of a state in our sense refers to the state in which the (objective) world can
be, i.e., (via the function pi ) a complete description of the world in terms of truth and
falsity of the propositional atoms. Thus it refers to a state of the world rather than that of
an agent. 7 It should not be confused with the epistemic, or more generally, mental state of
an agent. The latter can be viewed as being represented in our framework by the relation
R and the function c0 in the model (with respect to the epistemic and capability aspects,
respectively).
The models for the language LC are further equipped with elements used to interpret
the agents’ wishes, selections and commitments. Wishes are interpreted through an
6 This might be understood in the following sense: even an action that has no effect on the truth of the formulas
such as a ‘skip’ action, still results in a state where the history of performed actions is changed. This idea is very
similar to the notion of a (Herbrand) situation in the situation calculus ([28,31,49,53]), and can be made formal
by considering propositions (or variables) recording the history. In order to not complicate our models further we
will mostly leave this implicit in this paper, apart from some places where it is crucial.
7 In a ‘situated automata’ approach to knowledge as mentioned in Section 2, the state may be thought of to
include the ‘internal’ or ‘local’ state of an agent, which is determined completely by the propositional atoms
‘local to the agent’. In this case states (here often referred to as global states) are typically represented as vectors
of ‘local’ states of the agents in the system at hand. See, e.g., [15,38].
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accessibility relation on worlds that denotes worlds that are (more) desirable from the
agent’s point of view. Selections are straightforwardly interpreted through a set of formulae
that denotes the choices that an agent has made. From a formal point of view, this set acts
as a kind of awareness on the wishes of an agent, thereby ensuring an intuitively acceptable
behaviour of goals. Originally, Fagin and Halpern [14] introduced the idea of awareness
sets as a means to solve the so-called problems of logical omniscience. As we will see in
Section 6, the effect of the selection sets on the behaviour of goals is similar to that of the
awareness sets on the properties of knowledge. The agents’ commitments are interpreted by
means of an agenda function, which yields for each agent in every state the commitments
that it has made and is up to. Detailed accounts of the respective interpretations are given
in the following sections.
Definition 4.2. A model M for the language LC is a tuple containing the core elements of
Definition 4.1, the functions W : A→ ℘(S×S), which determines the desirability relation
of an agent in a state, and C : A× S→ ℘(L) denoting the choices made by an agent in a
state, and a function Agenda: A× S→℘(Ac), which records the commitments of agents.
Note that the agenda records syntactical entities (as opposed to our earlier preliminary
account in [36], where semantical entities, viz. computation sequences, are recorded). In
order to get strong results about the agent’s knowledge of commitments (Proposition 7.17,
in particular part 2) we need a syntactical representation, which may yield different
(semantical) computation sequences in different possible worlds (e.g., when if-statements
are recorded in the agenda). We will return to this issue in Section 7.
Note furthermore that in general it is allowed that the agenda contains multiple actions.
This means that the agent has multiple commitments, and should be in need of some
strategy to select and perform these. In this paper we will not pursue this. On the contrary,
to keep matters simple we will stipulate in Definition 7.9 below that an agent will only be
able to commit to a new action if its agenda is empty. We interpret the acts of selecting,
committing and uncommitting as model-transformations. The act of selecting changes a
model by affecting the set of choices, and the act of (un)committing transforms the agent’s
agenda. To account for these modifications, we introduce the set of possible result models
of a given model for LC.
Definition 4.3. Let M ∈ MC be some model for LC. The class MC∼ ⊆MC contains all
models that (possibly) differ from M only in the C or the Agenda functions.
In our interpretation of actions as given in Definition 4.4 below, we generalise the
standard paradigm of actions as state-transitions [21] by interpreting actions as transitions
between pairs (Model, State) rather than transitions between states per se. Using this
more general interpretation we can both account for regular actions that cause a transition
between states upon execution, and special actions that transform models. Among the
special actions that we considered elsewhere [35] were those modelling informational
attitudes such as observations and communication; in Section 7 we will formalise the acts
of committing and uncommitting in a similar way.
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Furthermore, to keep in line with the idea expressed in Definition 4.1 that the
performance of actions, when successful, always leads to different states, we sometimes
need to provide ‘copies’ of states. More formally, this is done by assuming in the model
for every state s a special variable h such that s(h) yields the list of semi-atomic actions
performed successively so far (the ‘history’). 8 The variable h doesn’t appear in the
language L0. For a state s, and a semi-atomic action a, we denote by sa the state that
is as s (with respect to all properties regarding pi,r0,c0 and all accessibility relations such
as R and W), but in which sa(h) is equal to s(h) appended with a. Since h doesn’t occur
in L0, we have that for all formulae ϕ ∈ L0, M, s |= ϕ⇔M, sa |= ϕ.
Definition 4.4. The binary relation |= between a formula from L and a pair M, s consisting
of a model M ∈M and a state s in M, is for ϕ a propositional symbol, a negation, or a
disjunction inductively defined as usual. For the other cases M, s |= ϕ is defined by:
M, s |=Kiϕ⇔∀s′ ∈ S((s, s′) ∈ R(i)⇒M, s′ |= ϕ),
M, s |= 〈doi (α)〉ϕ⇔∃M′, s′(M′, s′ ∈ r(i, α)(M, s)& M′, s′ |= ϕ),
M, s |=Aiα⇔ c(i, α)(M, s)= 1,
where r and c are defined as follows:
r(i, a)(M, s)=M,r0(i, a)(s),
r(i, ϕ?)(M, s)=
{
M, sϕ? if M, s |= ϕ,
∅ otherwise,
r(i, α1;α2)(M, s)= r(i, α2)(r(i, α1)(M, s)),
r(i,if ϕ then α1 else α2 fi)(M, s)
=
{
r(i, α1)(M, sϕ?) if M, s |= ϕ,
r(i, α2)(M, s¬ϕ?) otherwise,
r(i, while φ do α od)(M, s)
=M′, s′ such that ∃k ∈N ∃M0, s0 . . . ∃Mk, sk
(M0, s0 =M, s& Mk, sk =M′, s′
&∀j < k(Mj+1, sj+1 = r(i, ϕ?;α)(Mj , sj ))
& M′, s′ |= ¬ϕ),
where r(i, α)(∅)= ∅,
and
c(i, a)(M, s)= c0(i, a)(s),
c(i, ϕ?)(M, s)=
{
1 if M, s |= ϕ,
0 otherwise,
8 Strictly speaking this goes slightly beyond the propositional set-up, where variables only get the values ‘true’
or ‘false’.
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c(i, α1;α2)(M, s)= c(i, α1)(M, s)&c(i, α2)(r(i, α1)(M, s)),
c(i,if ϕ then α1 else α2 fi)(M, s)
= c(i, ϕ?;α1)(M, s) or c(i,¬ϕ?;α2)(M, s),
c(i, while φ do α od)(M, s)
=
{
1 if c(i, (ϕ?;α)k;¬ϕ?)(M, s)= 1 for some k ∈N,
0 otherwise,
where c(i, α)(∅)= 0.
Validity in a model and in a class of models is defined as usual.
With regard to the abilities of agents, the motivation for the choices made in Defini-
tion 4.4 is the following. The definition of c(i, ϕ?) expresses that an agent is able to get
confirmation for a formula ϕ iff ϕ holds. An agent is capable of performing a sequential
composition α1;α2 iff it is capable of performing α1 (now), and it is capable of executing
α2 after it has performed α1. An agent is capable of performing a conditional composi-
tion, if either it is able to confirm the condition and thereafter perform the then-part, or it
is able to confirm the negation of the condition and perform the else-part afterwards. An
agent is capable of performing a repetitive composition while ϕ do α od iff it is able to
perform the action (ϕ?;α1)k;¬ϕ? for some natural number k, i.e., it is able to perform the
kth unwinding of the while-loop. More about capabilities and their properties can be found
in [37].
5. Formalising wishes
Wishes are here taken to be the most primitive motivational attitudes, i.e., in ultimo
agents are motivated to fulfill their wishes. As mentioned in Section 3, we formalise wishes
through a plain normal modal operator, i.e., wishes are straightforwardly interpreted as a
necessity operator over the accessibility relation W.
Definition 5.1. The binary relation |=C between a formula in LC and a pair M, s consisting
of a model M for LC and a state s in M is for wishes defined as follows:
M, s |=C Wiϕ⇔∀s′ ∈ S((s, s′) ∈W(i)⇒M, s′ |=C ϕ).
In order to allow for maximal flexibility regarding wishes (which may be quite
irrational), we do not impose any restrictions on the accessibility relation W. In fact, one
may even argue that representing wishes by a (normal) modal operator in itself already
imposes too much rationality. It is well-known that normal modal operators have certain
properties that are occasionally considered undesirable for the commonsense notions that
they are intended to formalise. For example, although the formal notions of knowledge
and belief are closed under logical consequence, this property will in general not hold
for human knowledge and belief (although it will for instance hold for the information
that is recorded in a database, and it can also be defended for the knowledge and belief
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of an artificial agent). When formalising motivational attitudes the undesired properties
induced by closure under logical consequence become even more pregnant. For agents do
in general not desire all the logical consequences of their wishes, nor do they consider
the logically inevitable to be among their goals. For example, an agent that wants its teeth
to be restored will in general not want or wish for the pain that inevitably accompanies
such a restoration. And although the sun rises in the east there will hardly be an agent
that desires this to be the case. The problem embodied by the former example is known
as the side-effect problem; the problem that all logical tautologies are wishes (goals) of
an agent is known as the transference problem. Both in syntactical shape as in meaning,
these problems are closely related to the problems of logical omniscience that have plagued
formalisations of informational attitudes for many years. In terms of our framework, seven
of the most (in)famous problems of logical omniscience can be formulated as follows.
Definition 5.2. Let ϕ,ψ ∈ L be formulae, and let X be some operator.
• |=Xϕ ∧X(ϕ→ ψ)→Xψ LO1
• |= ϕ⇒|=Xϕ LO2
• |= ϕ→ ψ⇒|=Xϕ→Xψ LO3
• |= ϕ↔ψ⇒|=Xϕ↔Xψ LO4
• |= (Xϕ ∧Xψ)→X(ϕ ∧ψ) LO5
• |=Xϕ→X(ϕ ∨ψ) LO6
• |= ¬(Xϕ ∧X¬ϕ). LO7
Properties LO1 and LO3 as given in Definition 5.2 capture the side-effect problem,
and property LO2 captures the transference problem. Of the other properties given not
all are equally problematic when formalising wishes. In our opinion, property LO4 is
not that problematic, and could even be considered desirable, dependent on the demands
for rationality that one is willing to make. Property LO5, which we like to think of
as representing ‘the problem of unrestricted combining’, is in general undesirable when
formalising motivational attitudes. This is for instance shown by the example of a (human)
agent that likes both a sandwich with peanut butter and one with Camembert cheese, but
not together. Property LO6, for which we coin the term ‘the problem of unrestricted
weakening’, is a special instantiation of the side-effect problem. That this property is
undesirable is shown by the example of an agent desiring itself to be painted green, without
desiring being green or being crushed under a steam roller. 9 Property LO7 is unacceptable
for certain kinds of motivational attitudes but a necessity for others. It is for instance
perfectly possible for agents to have contradicting wishes, 10 but it seems hardly rational
to allow agents to try and fulfill these conflicting wishes simultaneously. Thus, whereas
the absence of LO7 is essential when formalising wishes, the presence is when formalising
goals.
9 The problem of unrestricted weakening is intuitively related to Ross’ paradox [52], well-known in deontic
logic [1,39]. The standard counterexample towards the desirability of LO6 in a deontic context, where the operator
X is interpreted as ‘being obliged to’, is that of an agent that is obliged to mail a letter while (intuitively) not being
obliged to either mail the letter or burn it.
10 Even stronger, human agents will almost always suffer from conflicts between their wishes.
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It turns out that our formalisation of wishes validates all but one of the properties of
logical omniscience.
Proposition 5.3. All of the properties of logical omniscience formalised in Definition 5.2,
with the exception of LO7, are valid for the Wi operator.
Although we argued against the properties of logical omniscience when formalising
motivational attitudes, we do not consider it a serious problem that our formalisation of
wishes validates (almost all of) these properties. For these wishes are both implicit in the
terminology of Levesque [29] and passive in the sense of Castelfranchi et al. [7]. Being
implicit, it will not be the case that agents explicitly desire all of their wishes. 11 Being
passive, wishes in themselves do not actively influence the course of action that an agent
is going to take. Through the act of selecting, agents turn some of their implicit, passive
wishes into explicit, active goals. Hence even though an agent implicitly and passively
desires all logical consequences of one of its wishes, it will not do so explicitly and actively.
Therefore Proposition 5.3 is not taken to represent a severe problem for a formalisation of
(implicit and passive) wishes, whereas it would for a formalisation of (explicit and active)
goals. In the following section it will be shown how the properties of logical omniscience
are avoided for goals.
6. Setting goals
As remarked previously, an agent’s goals are not primitive but induced by its wishes.
Basically, an agent selects among its (implicit and passive) wishes those that it (explicitly
and actively) aims to fulfil. Given the rationality of agents, these selected wishes should
be both unfulfilled and implementable: it does not make sense for an agent to try and
fulfil a wish that either already has been fulfilled or for which fulfilment is not a practical
possibility. We do not take the latter constraint too stringently, i.e., we only demand wishes
to be individually implementable without requiring a simultaneous implementability of all
chosen wishes. However, if desired, constraints like simultaneous implementability are
easily formulated. The act of selecting is treated as a fully-fledged action by defining the
opportunity, ability and result of selecting. Informally, an agent has the opportunity to
select any of its wishes, corresponding to the idea that choices are only restricted by the
elements among which is to be chosen. However, an agent is capable of selecting only
those formulae that are unfulfilled and implementable, which can be thought of as it having
a built-in aversion against selecting fulfilled or practically impossible formulae. The result
of a selection will consist of the selected formula being marked chosen.
As stated in the introduction the selection mechanism as proposed here is perhaps too
liberal to be realistic for a rational agent. One might consider replacing the selection
condition of ‘unfulfilled and implementable’ by something stronger based on decision-
theoretic utilities and preferences. 12 Of course, the model should then be enriched
11 For the implicit belief that, in combination with awareness, constitutes explicit belief in the approach of Fagin
and Halpern [14], it is also considered unproblematic that the properties of logical omniscience are validated.
12 A very interesting semantic approach along these lines is proposed by [13,61].
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accordingly to accommodate for this. Here we have chosen to abstract from this and
concentrate on the overall logical framework.
The notion of unfulfilledness is straightforwardly formalised as ‘not holding’, i.e., a
formula ϕ is unfulfilled in a state s of some model M if and only if M, s 6|=C ϕ. Defining
implementability is a little more elaborate. Roughly speaking, we define a formula ϕ to be
implementable for an agent i , denoted by ♦iϕ, if i has the practical possibility to fulfil ϕ
by performing an appropriate sequence of atomic actions. 13
Definition 6.1. The binary relation |=C between a formula in LC and a pair M, s consisting
of a model M for LC and a state s in M is for implementability formulae defined by:
M, s |=C ♦iϕ⇔∃k ∈N ∃a1, . . . , ak ∈At
(M, s |=C PracPossi (a1; . . . ;ak,ϕ)).
Having defined unfulfilledness and implementability, we can now formally introduce
the select action.
Definition 6.2. For M ∈MC with state s, i ∈A and ϕ ∈ L we define:
rC(i,selectϕ)(M, s)=
{∅ if M, s |=C ¬Wiϕ,
choose(i, ϕ)(M, s), s if M, s |=C Wiϕ,
where for M= 〈S,pi,R,r0,c0,W,C,Agenda〉 we define
choose(i, ϕ)(M, s)= 〈S,pi,R,r0,c0,W,C′,Agenda〉
with C′(i ′, s′) = C(i ′, s′) if i 6= i ′ or s 6= s′,
C′(i, s) = C(i, s) ∪ {ϕ},
cC(i,selectϕ)(M, s)= 1⇔M, s |=C ¬ϕ ∧♦iϕ.
The binary relation |=C between a formula in LC and a pair M, s consisting of a model M
for LC and a state s in M is for choices defined by:
M, s |=C Ciϕ⇔ ϕ ∈ C(i, s).
The definition of rC for the selection actions indeed provides for a correct model
transformation.
Proposition 6.3. For all M ∈ MC with state s, for all i ∈ A and ϕ ∈ L, if M′, s =
rC(i,selectϕ)(M, s) then M′ ∈MC∼.
13 As was pointed out by Maarten de Rijke, defining the implementability operator in this way makes it a kind
of ‘dual master modality’ (cf. [17,56]). A formula consisting of a formula ϕ prefixed by the master modality is
true in some state s of a model iff ϕ holds at all states that are reachable by any finite sequence of transitions
from s . Such a formula is false iff there is some state s′, reachable by some finite sequence of transitions from s ,
at which ϕ does not hold. This indeed makes our implementability modality to be a dual master modality.
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Besides being correct in that well-defined models are transformed into well-defined
models, our formalisation of the act of selecting is also correct with respect to minimal
change. That is, the change caused by selecting some formula is minimal given that the
formula is to be marked chosen, which implies that our formalisation of selections does not
suffer from the frame problem. The following proposition provides a (partial) formalisation
of this property.
Proposition 6.4. For all M ∈ MC with state s, for all i ∈ A and ϕ ∈ L, if M′, s =
rC(i,selectϕ)(M, s) then for all states s′ in M, M, s′ |=C ψ iff M′, s′ |=C ψ , for all
ψ ∈ L.
Proposition 6.4 states that all formulae from L are interpreted identically in a model
M and in the one resulting from selecting some formula in an arbitrary state of M. As a
direct consequence of this proposition we have the following corollary, which states that
the interpretation of wishes and implementability formulae persists under selecting some
formula.
Corollary 6.5. For all M ∈ MC with state s, for all i ∈ A and ϕ ∈ L, if M′, s =
rC(i,selectϕ)(M, s) then for all states s′ in M and all ψ ∈ L:
• M, s′ |=C Wiψ⇔M′, s′ |=C Wiψ .
• M, s′ |=C ♦iψ⇔M′, s′ |=C ♦iψ .
Having defined wishes and selections one might be tempted to straightforwardly define
goals to be selected wishes, i.e.,
Goaliϕ
def= Wiϕ ∧Ciϕ.
This definition is however not adequate to formalise the idea of goals being selected,
unfulfilled, implementable wishes. The reason for this is that in well-defined models
from MC no relation is imposed between ‘being selected’ and ‘being unfulfilled and
implementable’, i.e., one is not prevented by Definition 4.2 to come up with a well-defined
model M in which for certain i and s the set C(i, s) contains formulae ϕ that are either
fulfilled or not implementable. We see basically two ways of solving this problem, a
semantical and a syntactical one. Semantically one could restrict the set of well-defined
models for LC to those in which the set C(i, s) contains for all agents i and states s
only unfulfilled and implementable formulae, thereby ensuring beforehand that goals are
unfulfilled and implementable when using the definition suggested above. Syntactically
one could define goals to be only those selected wishes that are indeed unfulfilled and
implementable. Hence instead of (semantically) restricting the set of well-defined models
for LC one (syntactically) expands the definition of goals. Although both the semantic
and the syntactic approach are equally well applicable, we will restrict ourselves here
to pursuing the syntactic one. Therefore, goals are defined to be those wishes that are
unfulfilled, implementable and selected.
Definition 6.6. The Goali operator is for i ∈A and ϕ ∈ L defined by:
Goaliϕ
def= Wiϕ ∧¬ϕ ∧ ♦iϕ ∧Ciϕ.
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As mentioned above, the goals of agents, being the explicit and active notions that they
are, are not to validate the properties of logical omniscience as formalised in Definition 5.2.
Fortunately, though not surprisingly, this indeed turns out to be the case when defining
goals as in Definition 6.6.
Proposition 6.7. None of the properties of logical omniscience formalised in Defini-
tion 5.2, with the exception of LO7, is valid for the Goali operator.
The only property of logical omniscience satisfied by the goal operator, viz. LO7,
formalises the idea that an agent’s goals are consistent. This is a highly desirable property
for rational creatures. For although it is quite possible for a rational agent to have
contradictory wishes, it is rather irrational to try and fulfil these simultaneously.
Besides invalidating the undesired ones among the properties of logical omniscience,
particularly those embodying the side-effect and transference problem, our definition
of goals and selections has some other pleasant and desirable features. The following
proposition formalises some of these features together with some properties characterising
the act of selecting.
Proposition 6.8. For all i ∈A and ϕ ∈ L we have:
(1) |=C Wiϕ↔〈doi (selectϕ)〉>.
(2) |=C 〈doi (selectϕ)〉>↔ 〈doi (selectϕ)〉Ciϕ.
(3) |=C ¬Aiselectϕ→[doi (selectϕ)]¬Goaliϕ.
(4) |=C PracPossi (selectϕ,>)↔〈doi (selectϕ)〉Goaliϕ.
(5) |=C ϕ⇒|=C ¬Goaliϕ.
(6) (ϕ→ψ)→ (Goaliϕ→Goaliψ) is not for all ϕ,ψ ∈ L valid.
(7) Ki (ϕ→ψ)→ (Goaliϕ→Goaliψ) is not for all ϕ,ψ ∈ L valid.
The first item of Proposition 6.8 states that agents have the opportunity to select all, and
nothing but, their wishes. The second item formalises the idea that every choice for which
an agent has the opportunity results in the selected wish being marked chosen. In the third
item it is stated that whenever an agent is unable to select some formula, then selecting
this formula will not result in it becoming one of its goals. The related item (4) states that
all, and nothing but, practically possible selections result in the chosen formula being a
goal. The fifth item provides a strengthening of the invalidation of the second property of
logical omniscience, which embodies the transference problem. It states that no logically
inevitable formula qualifies as a goal. Hence whenever a formula is valid this does not only
not necessarily imply that it is a goal but it even necessarily implies that it is not. The last
two items of Proposition 6.8 are related to the avoidance of the transference problem, and
state that goals are neither closed under implications nor under known implications.
7. Formalising commitments
The last part of our formalisation of motivational attitudes concerns the agents’
commitments. Commitments to actions represent promises to perform these actions, i.e., an
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agent that is committed to an action has promised itself to perform the action. As mentioned
above, commitments may be made to plans for goals, i.e., whenever an agent is committed
it should be to an action that is correct and feasible to bring about at least one of its goals.
Not only do we formalise this static aspect of made commitments, but we also consider
the dynamic aspect of making and undoing commitments. The act of committing is related
to, and can be seen as, an elementary implementation of practical reasoning, the process
through which agents decide that they should perform certain actions (their ought-to-do’s)
on the basis of their wishes, desires or goals (their ought-to-be’s). Ever since Aristotle, the
study of practical reasoning has formed a major constituent of the research in analytical
philosophy [48]. According to Von Wright [64], the essence of practical reasoning is best
captured by the following syllogism:
i intends to make it true that ϕ.
i thinks that, unless it does α, it will not achieve this.
Therefore i intends to do α.
The simplified version of practical reasoning that we aim to formalise through the act of
committing can be described by the following syllogism:
i knows that ϕ is one of its goals.
i knows that α is correct and feasible with respect to ϕ.
Therefore i has the opportunity to commit itself to α.
This corresponds to the idea that commitments may be made to actions that are known to
be correct and feasible to achieve some of the agent’s known goals. 14
Commitments are formalised through the Committed
_
_ operator: Committediα
denotes that agent i is committed to the action α. The act of committing is modelled by
the (special) action commit_to_: commit_toα represents the act of committing to the
(regular) action α. As mentioned in Section 3, commitments, though in general persistent,
should not be maintained when having become useless or impossible, i.e., agents should
have the possibility to undo useless or impossible commitments. This act of uncommitting
is formalised by the uncommit_ action: uncommitα denotes the act of undoing the
commitment to the action α. In the sequel we successively formalise the act of committing,
the commitments that have been made, and the act of uncommitting.
7.1. Getting committed
The act of committing, though of a special nature compared to other actions, is
treated as a fully-fledged action, i.e., we define what it means to have the ability or
14 We abstract here from the way how exactly an agent comes to know that α is correct and feasible with respect
to ϕ. This may be by means of a classical planner like STRIPS [16], or by consulting/using a kind of pre-compiled
plan base as in certain agent architectures. Also, in case there are more possibilities for actions α to get to the
goal ϕ, we do not consider a particular mechanism to choose such action (in some optimal way). We only say
that when ϕ is a known goal and α is known to be correct and feasible for obtaining ϕ, the agent may (has the
opportunity) to commit to that action α, allowing maximal flexibility on the agent’s part whether it will actually
perform such a commitment.
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opportunity to commit, and what the result of committing is. To start with the latter notion,
given the relation between the infinitive ‘to commit’ and the past participle ‘committed’,
it seems rather obvious that the act of committing should result in the agent being
committed. Determining when an agent has the opportunity to perform a commit_toα
action is equally obvious, for it is inspired by the syllogism describing our version of
practical reasoning given above. Hence agent i has the opportunity to perform the action
commit_toα if and only if it knows that α is correct and feasible to bring about one of
its goals. This leaves to determine the constituents of the ability of an agent to commit
itself. Our definition of this ability is inspired by the observation that situations where
agents are committed to two (or more) essentially different actions are highly problematic.
Since ‘being committed to α’ intuitively corresponds to ‘having promised (to oneself) to
perform α next (or at least as soon as possible)’, it is unclear how to interpret the case
where an agent is committed to two different actions. Should both actions be performed
simultaneously? But what does it mean that actions are performed simultaneously? Are
they performed concurrent, interleaved or in parallel? Or should the actions be performed
sequentially? If so, in which order? And what then if the commitment to perform one
action does not persist under execution of the other action? It is clear that these questions
have no unique answers. Here we shall assume simply that agents do not have multiple
commitments. One way to ensure this is to let an agent have the ability to commit itself
only if it is not up to any previously made commitments, i.e., an agent is capable to commit
only if it is not already committed. (However, it should also be clear that in principle our
framework allows other, more complicated situations, if one would be interested to model
that. However, since some of the results in the sequel depend on the present choice, these
should be reconsidered then.)
As mentioned previously, an agent’s commitments are interpreted by means of the so-
called agenda function. The idea is that this function yields, for a given agent and a given
state, the actions that the agent is committed to. Whenever an agent successfully commits
itself to an action the agent’s agenda is updated accordingly. The actual formal definition
capturing this fairly unsophisticated idea is itself rather complicated. The reason for this
lies in various desiderata that commitments and the act of committing should meet.
The first of these desiderata is that commitments should be known, i.e., agents should
be aware of the commitments that they have made. To bring about this knowledge of
commitments, epistemic equivalence classes rather than states are considered in an agenda
update. Thus whenever agent i commits itself to action α in some state s of a model, the
agenda of all states s′ that are epistemically equivalent with s is updated appropriately.
The second and very important desideratum imposed on commitments is that they
behave compositionally correct, i.e., the commitment to a composite action is linked in
a rational way to commitments to its constituents. It is, for example, desirable that an
agent that is committed to an action if ϕ then α1 else α2 fi is also committed to
α1 whenever it knows that ϕ holds, and that an agent committed to the action α1;α2 is
(currently) committed to α1 and committed to α2 in the state of affairs that results from
executing α1.
To bring about rational behaviour of commitments with respect to sequentially
composed actions the actual update does not just concern the epistemic equivalence class
of the current state, but also that of all the states that lay alongside the execution trajectory
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of the action. For example, if an agent i commits itself to α1;α2 in the state s of some
model, then the epistemic equivalence class of s is updated with the commitment to α1,
and the epistemic equivalence class of the state s′′ that results from executing α1 in some
s′ that is an element of the epistemic equivalence of s is updated with the commitment
to α2.
Although we will put in the agent’s agenda (syntactical) actions that represent actions
it is committed to, we will, of course, also need semantical entities to link these actions
to what actually happens when an agent performs (part of) the action in its agenda. To
this end we will use some notions that are well-known from the area of the semantics
of programming languages, viz. computation sequences, computation runs and transition
relations. Let us start with the introduction of computation sequences and runs.
Since the actions from Ac are deterministic, for each event built out of these actions
there is at most one finite computation sequence which consists of the (semi-)atomic
actions that occur in the halting executing of the event. Or phrased differently, the set
of finite computation runs of a given event doi (α) is either empty or a singleton set. This
property of deterministic actions facilitates the definition of finite computation runs to a
considerable extent: we simply define it to be the unique finite computation sequence for
which execution terminates.
Recall the definition of Acseq from Definition 2.1.
Definition 7.1. The function CS, yielding the finite computation sequences of a given
action, is inductively defined as follows.
CS : Ac→℘(Acseq),
CS(α)= {α} if α is semi-atomic,
CS(α1;α2)= {α′1;α′2 | α′1 ∈ CS(α1), α′2 ∈ CS(α2)},
CS(if ϕ then α1 else α2 fi)= CS(ϕ?;α1) ∪CS(¬ϕ?;α2),
CS(while ϕ do α od)=
∞⋃
k=1
Seqk(while ϕ do α od)∪ {¬ϕ?},
where for k > 1
Seqk(while ϕ do α od)
= {(ϕ?;α′1); . . . ; (ϕ?;α′k);¬ϕ? | α′j ∈ CS(α1) for j = 1, . . . , k}.
Definition 7.2. Since Ac is closed under the core clauses of Definition 2.1 only, the
function CS : Ac→ ℘(Acseq) is defined as usual. For M ∈MC the function CRCM : A×
Ac× S→ ℘(Acseq) is defined by:
CRCM(i, α, s)= {α′ ∈ CS(α) | rC(i, α′)(M, s) 6= ∅}.
Note that the actions that we consider are deterministic, i.e., the set CRCM(i, α, s) consists
of at most one element, for any i, α, s. This must be kept in mind below, when we consider
properties of computation runs. Moreover, since actions are deterministic we will often
write (sloppily) CRCM(i, α, s)= α′ instead of CRCM(i, α, s)= {α′}.
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Let, for sets A1,A2 ∈ ℘(Acseq), A1;A2 stand for the set {α1;α2 | α1 ∈ A1, α2 ∈ A2}.
Then we can state the following.
Proposition 7.3. If rC(i, α1;α2)(M, s) 6= ∅ then
CRCM(i, α1;α2, s)= CRCM(i, α1, s);CRCM(i, α2, s′)
for (the unique) s′ ∈ rC(i, α1)(M, s).
Next we introduce the notion of a transition relation in the spirit of Structural Operational
Semantics of Plotkin [43], which is a very neat and elegant way to describe computation
by means of (single) transition steps. This method is widely used in computer science and
we can use it here fruitfully to describe what happens with the agent’s agenda when it
performs actions step by step (from that agenda, so to speak).
In our set-up we (first) consider transitions of the form 〈α, s〉 ⇀Mi,a 〈α′, s′〉, where
M ∈MC, α,α′ ∈ Ac, i ∈ A, a ∈ At+ and s, s′ ∈ S. (To ease notation in the sequel we will
drop the superscript M if the set of states S in the model M is understood.) We use the
symbol Λ for the empty action, with as property that Λ;α = α;Λ = α. Furthermore, we
use the projection function pi2, which is assumed to yield the second element of a pair.
Transitions are given by the following deductive system, often called a transition system:
Definition 7.4. Let the model M ∈MC be given. The transition system TM is given by the
following axioms:
• 〈α, s〉⇀i,α 〈Λ,s′〉 with s′ = pi2(rC(i, α)(M, s)) if α is semi-atomic and rC(i, α)(M,
s) 6= ∅,
• 〈if ϕ then α1 else α2 fi, s〉⇀i,ϕ? 〈α1, sϕ?〉 if s |= ϕ,
• 〈if ϕ then α1 else α2 fi, s〉⇀i,¬ϕ? 〈α2, s¬ϕ?〉 if s 6|= ϕ,
• 〈while ϕ do α od, s〉⇀i,ϕ? 〈α;while ϕ do α od, sϕ?〉 if s |= ϕ,
• 〈while ϕ do α od, s〉⇀i,¬ϕ? 〈Λ,s¬ϕ?〉 if s 6|= ϕ,
and the following rule:
• 〈α1, s〉⇀i,a 〈α
′
1, s
′〉
〈α1;α2, s〉⇀i,a 〈α′1;α2, s′〉
.
Obviously, there is a relation between transitions and the computation runs we
introduced earlier. This relation is given by the following proposition. (Here we use as
a convention that CRCM(i,Λ, s) is the empty sequence of actions.)
Proposition 7.5. CRCM(i, α, s)= a;CRCM(i, α′, s′) iff
TM ` 〈α, s〉⇀i,a 〈β, s′〉
for some β with CRCM(i, β, s′)= CRCM(i, α′, s′).
This proposition gives us as a corollary how computation runs can be viewed as being
generated by transitions.
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Corollary 7.6. CRCM(i, α, s)= {a1;a2; . . . ;an} iff
TM ` 〈α, s〉⇀i,a1 〈α1, s1〉⇀i,a2 〈α2, s2〉⇀i,a3 · · ·⇀i,an 〈αn, sn〉
for some α1, . . . , αn ∈Ac, s1, . . . , sn ∈ S, such that αn =Λ.
Finally, we extend the transition relation 〈α, s〉⇀Mi,a 〈α′, s′〉 to the relation 〈α, s〉 →Mi,a
〈α′, s′〉, which is like the former, but now also the performance of a semi-atomic action a
not matching with the start of the action α is covered. As we will employ this transition
system to describe how the agent’s agenda is transformed under performance/execution of
actions, in this case the agenda (containing α) should remain the same (for nothing from it
is being done). So we stipulate:
Definition 7.7. For M ∈ MC, α,α′ ∈ Ac, i ∈ A, a ∈ At+ and s, s′ ∈ S we define the
transition relation 〈α, s〉 →Mi,a 〈α′, s′〉 as the transition relation 〈α, s〉⇀Mi,a 〈α′, s′〉 extended
with the clause
〈α, s〉 →Mi,a 〈α, s′〉
where s′ = pi2(rC(i, a)(M, s)) and a is not a prefix of CRCM(i, α, s). (In the sequel we will
drop the superscript M again.)
Intuitively, the extra clause for→i,a means that the execution of a in this case does not
help resolving the agenda, so that this remains to be done in its totality. 15
For reasons of convenience we introduce, analogously to the Can-predicate, a so-called
Intend-predicate, which is meant to formalise the (possible) intentions of agents. The
definition of this predicate is based on the idea that agents (possibly) intend to do all the
actions that are correct and feasible with respect to some of their goals. As such, possible
intention provides the precondition for successful commitment. 16
Definition 7.8. For α ∈AcC, i ∈A and ϕ ∈ L we define:
PossIntendi (α,ϕ)
def= Cani (α,ϕ)∧KiGoaliϕ.
Having established the formal prerequisites, we can now present the definitions
formalising the intuitive description of the act of committing as presented above.
Definition 7.9. For all M ∈MC with state s, for all i ∈A and α ∈Ac we define:
15 Our model may be (again) too liberal in the sense that nothing in our framework prevents an agent to perform,
at any time, something else than is in its agenda (which then remains being recorded). In practice it may be
imperative to, e.g., start right away with the execution of (the actions recorded in) its agenda or not interrupt
the execution of its agenda when having started this. We believe that in general it is difficult to give conditions
for this; we feel it heavily depends on the application. Here we have again chosen for a simple model as a first
approximation, which may be modified easily if one would like to.
16 Our paraphrase of Cohen and Levesque’s motto ‘intention is choice plus commitment’ [9] could therefore be
stated as ‘commitments are chosen possible intentions’.
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rC(i,commit_toα)(M, s)
=
{∅ if M, s |=C ¬PossIntendi (α,ϕ) for all ϕ ∈ C(i, s),
M′, s otherwise,
with M′ = 〈S,pi,R,r0,c0,W,C,Agenda′〉where Agenda′ is minimal such that it is closed
under the following conditions:
• for all s′ ∈ [s]R(i),
Agenda′(i, s′)=Agenda(i, s′)∪ {α},
• for all s′, s′′, s′′′ ∈ S, α′ ∈ Agenda′(i, s′) such that, for some semi-atomic a, TM `
〈α′, s′〉 →i,a 〈α′′, s′′〉 and s′′′ ∈ [s′′]R(i):
Agenda′(i, s′′′)=Agenda(i, s′′′)∪ {α′′}.
cC(i,commit_toα)(M, s)= 1 iff Agenda(i, s)= ∅.
This definition makes sure that in the state where the commitment to an action α is made,
the agent’s agenda is updated with α, as well as in any state that is epistemically equivalent
with s, i.e., in the epistemic equivalence class of s. The latter will have as an effect that the
commitment to α is known to the agent, since every epistemic alternative to s will contain
the same commitment in the agenda. Moreover, the rest of the definition ensures that the
agenda is also updated in all states reachable from s (or elements from its equivalence
class) by performing actions β that are according to the fulfilment of executing the action
α by putting in the agenda the ‘remainder’ of α after its ‘partial execution’ β .
The clause in the definition regarding the capability function is such that an agent is only
able to commit to some α if its agenda is empty. This is, of course, a very strong restriction,
to which we will return at the end of our paper.
Note, by the way, that the definition above is intuitively in line with the restrictions
we’ve put on the models in Definition 4.1 in the sense that the execution of a commit
action preserves the property of having at most one action in the agent’s agenda (which is
the case on which we have focused). Without the restriction mentioned there in the fourth
bullet the successful performance of an atomic action might result in the same state, so that
this state would get two values of the agent’s agenda (viz. that associated with the situation
before the execution of the atomic action, and one associated with that after the execution),
which would violate the property mentioned. Moreover, intuitively, in this case the agent
cannot determine whether the atomic action of concern has yet to be performed or not,
which seems a rather undesirable property that we have excluded here by the restriction.
For example, suppose a;b ∈ Agenda′(i, s). If it now were the case that s ∈ r0(i, a)(s),
the closure condition in our definition above would yield that also b ∈ Agenda′(i, s). So,
since then both a and a;b are in the agent’s agenda in this situation, it cannot distinguish
whether a has been performed already or not. In Definition 4.4, an analogous problem
is circumvented for test actions, so that this problem does not occur for any semi-atomic
action.
A further important point to notice is that only the agenda of i is modified, and that only
in those states that are somehow, i.e., by a combination of state-transitions and epistemic
accessibility relations, connected to the state in which the commitment is being made. All
other elements of the model remain unchanged.
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The latter aspect mentioned above, i.e., the minimality of the change caused by perform-
ing a commitment, is partly formalised in Proposition 7.11 given below. Proposition 7.10
states the correctness of the definition of rC as presented above in the sense that it yields a
(unique) well-defined model when applied to a well-defined model.
Proposition 7.10. For all M ∈ MC with state s, for all i ∈ A and α ∈ Ac, if M′, s =
rC(i,commit_toα)(M, s) then M′ ∈MC∼.
Proposition 7.11. For all M ∈ MC with state s, for all i ∈ A and α ∈ Ac, if M′, s =
rC(i,commit_toα)(M, s) then for all states s′ in M, M, s′ |=C ϕ iff M′, s′ |=C ϕ, for
all ϕ ∈ L.
Additional properties related to the commit actions are given in Section 7.4.
We remark that due to the fact that the agenda contains syntactical elements (viz.
actions), we have the same element in the agenda within an epistemic equivalence class (so
that this is known to be committed to by the agent), but the interpretation (= execution) of
this agenda element may be quite different in the different worlds of the equivalence class.
This means that the agent may not know where the execution of its commitment amounts
to (and results in). This is quite a realistic feature, and is also in a sense reminiscent of
the Moore–Morgenstern discussion [40–42] concerning the need for a rigid designator
for an action in order to enable an agent to know how to do the action. As far as syntax
is concerned, the description is rigid (the same in every epistemic alternative world); as
to semantics/interpretation it is not. For example, an action consisting of a statement
“if ϕ then α1 else α2 fi” may amount to the execution of “α1” in some epistemic
alternatives (viz. where ϕ holds), while it may amount to “α2” in other alternatives (where
ϕ doesn’t hold), so that the agent doesn’t (a priori) know whether α1 or α2 will be executed.
But still he does know that he is committed to “if ϕ then α1 else α2 fi”!
7.2. Being committed
After the rather elaborate and fairly complicated definition formalising the act of
committing, defining what it means to be committed is a relatively straightforward and easy
job. Basically, agents are committed to the actions in its agenda. 17 The only additional
aspect that has to be taken into account when defining the semantics of the Committed
_
operator is that agents should start at the very beginning (a very good place to start), and
should therefore be also committed to initial executions of the actions in its agenda. As we
can represent executions by computation runs, we can thus say that an agent committed
to an action α should also be committed to actions that have computation runs that are
initial fragments of the computation run of α. Formally we ensure this behaviour by using
the prefix relation on basic actions. The notation Prefix(α,β) for α,β ∈ Acseq expresses
that action sequence α is a prefix of action sequence β . The definition of |=C for the
17 In our framework being committed to some action corresponds to having the intention to do this action in the
sense of Cohen and Levesque [9].
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Committedi operator could then be informally interpreted as ‘an agent is committed to
those actions of which the computation run is a prefix of one of the actions in its agenda’.
Definition 7.12. The binary relation |=C between a formula in LC and a pair M, s
consisting of a model M for LC and a state s in M is for commitments defined by:
M, s |=C Committediα⇔
∀s′ ∈ [s]R(i) ∃α1 ∈ CRCM(i, α, s′)∃α2 ∈Agenda(i, s′)
∃α′2 ∈ CRCM(i, α2, s′)(Prefix(α1, α′2)).
An investigation of the properties of the commitment operator is postponed to
Section 7.4.
7.3. Getting uncommitted
By performing an uncommit action, agents may undo previously made commitments
that turned out to be either useless or impossible. That is, as soon as an agent no longer
knows some commitment to be correct and feasible for any of its goals it may undo this
commitment. Just as we did for the commit action, we have to decide upon the constituents
of the result, opportunity and ability for the actions formalising the act of uncommitting.
The result of such an action is obvious: agents should no longer be committed to α after
a successful performance of an uncommitα action. 18 Defining what it means to have
the opportunity and ability to uncommit represents a somewhat more arbitrary choice. We
have decided to let an agent have the opportunity to undo any of its commitments, i.e.,
there is nothing in its circumstances that may prevent an agent to undo a commitment.
Our loyal, diligent agents are however only (morally) capable of undoing commitments
that have become redundant. The actual definition of the functions rC and cC consists of
nothing but a formalisation of these intuitive ideas.
Definition 7.13. For all M ∈MC with state s, for all i ∈A and α ∈Ac we define:
(For technical convenience, in the following we define, simultaneously with the new
agenda, the set ReachableM,s of states that are reachable from s by alternatively
considering epistemic alternatives and performing actions.)
rC(i,uncommitα)(M, s)
=
{∅ if M, s |=C ¬Committediα,
M′, s otherwise,
18 As was pointed out to us by John Fox, this description of the result of undoing a commitment comprises
a major simplification. For in real life, undoing commitments may involve more than just abandoning future
commitments: it may also be necessary to (try to) undo all the effects that followed from initially pursuing
the commitment. For example, if an agent that is committed to α1;α2 finds out after having done α1 that its
commitment to α2 should be undone, then it is very plausible that it should not only remove α2 from its agenda
but also try to undo as many of the effects of α1 as possible.
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with M′ = 〈S,pi,R,r0,c0,W,C,Agenda′〉 where Agenda′ and ReachableM,s are minimal
such that they are closed under the conditions:
• for all s′ ∈ [s]R(i):
s′ ∈ ReachableM,s, and
Agenda′(i, s′)=Agenda(i, s′) \ {β | Prefix(CRCM(i, α, s′),CRCM(i, β, s′))},
• for all s′ ∈ ReachableM,s , s′′, s′′′ ∈ S with α′ ∈Agenda′(i, s′) and such that, for some
semi-atomic a, TM ` 〈α′, s′〉→i,a 〈α′′, s′′〉 and s′′′ ∈ [s′′]R(i):
s′′′ ∈ ReachableM,s, and
Agenda′(i, s′′′)
=Agenda(i, s′′′) \ {β | Prefix(CRCM(i, α′′, s′′′),CRCM(i, β, s′′′))}.
cC(i,uncommitα)(M, s)= 1 iff M, s |=C ¬PossIntendi (α,ϕ) for all ϕ ∈ C(i, s).
Note the slight complication in this definition regarding prefixes: due to our definition of
being committed to an action if it constitutes the partial execution of some action that
is recorded in the agent’s agenda, we must also take care that when we uncommit to
some action α that we remove from the agent’s agenda all actions β that have α as their
partial execution. Formally this means that we remove all β that have the computation run
of α as a prefix of their computation run. This will ensure the desirable property below
(Proposition 7.16, (5) item) stating that when the agent uncommits to an action to which it
was committed, it will indeed be not committed to this action afterwards.
The clause regarding cC of the uncommit action states that an agent is (cap)able to
uncommitα (‘drop the intention to do α’) iff it doesn’t consider α a possible intention
anymore, viz. if it doesn’t know α to be correct and feasible for any known goal ϕ anymore.
Our definition of rC for the uncommit actions is also twofold correct: not only does
performing an uncommit action provide for a correct model-transformation, but also does
it do so while causing minimal change.
Proposition 7.14. For all M ∈ MC with state s, for all i ∈ A and α ∈ Ac, if M′, s =
rC(i,uncommitα)(M, s) then M′ ∈MC∼.
Proposition 7.15. For all M ∈ MC with state s, for all i ∈ A and α ∈ Ac, if M′, s =
rC(i,uncommitα)(M, s) then for all states s′ in M, M, s′ |=C ϕ iff M′, s′ |=C ϕ, for all
ϕ ∈ L.
Additional validities characterising the uncommit action are given below.
7.4. The statics and dynamics of commitments
Here we characterise the statics and dynamics of commitments by presenting some
validities for |=C. For a start we consider a number of validities characterising the dynamics
of commitments.
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Proposition 7.16. For all i ∈A, α,β ∈Ac and ϕ ∈ L we have:
(1) |=C PossIntendi (α,ϕ)→〈doi (commit_toα)〉>.
(2) |=C 〈doi (commit_toα)〉>↔ 〈doi (commit_toα)〉Committediα.
(3) |=C Committediα→¬Aicommit_toβ .
(4) |=C [doi (commit_toα)]¬Aicommit_toβ .
(5) |=C Committediα↔〈doi (uncommitα)〉¬Committediα.
(6) |=C PossIntendi (α,ϕ)→¬Aiuncommitα.
(7) |=C (Ciϕ↔KiCiϕ)→ (Aiuncommitα↔KiAiuncommitα).
(8) |=C Committediα ∧¬Cani (α,>)→Cani (uncommitα,¬Committediα).
The first two items of Proposition 7.16 jointly formalise our version of the syllogism of
practical reasoning as described above. In the third item it is stated that being committed
prevents an agent from having the ability to (re)commit. The fourth item states that the
act of committing is ability-destructive with respect to future commit actions, i.e., by
performing a commitment an agent loses its ability to make any other commitments.
Item (5) states that being committed is a necessary and sufficient condition for having
the opportunity to uncommit; as mentioned above, agents have the opportunity to undo
all of their commitments. In item (6) it is stated that agents are (morally) unable to undo
commitments to actions that are still known to be correct and feasible to achieve some goal.
In item (7) it is formalised that agents know of their abilities to uncommit to some action.
The last item states that whenever an agent is committed to an action that is no longer
known to be practically possible, it knows that it can undo this impossible commitment.
The following proposition formalises some of the desiderata for the statics of commit-
ments that turn out to be valid in the class MC of models for LC.
Proposition 7.17. For all i ∈A, α,α1, α2 ∈Ac and all ϕ ∈ L we have:
(1) |=C Committediα→KiCommittediα.
(2) |=C Committedi (α1;α2)→Committediα1 ∧Ki[doi (α1)]Committediα2.
(3) |=C Committediif ϕ then α1 else α2 fi∧Kiϕ→Committedi (ϕ?;α1).
(4) |=C Committediif ϕ then α1 else α2 fi∧Ki¬ϕ→Committedi (¬ϕ?;α2).
(5) |=C Committediwhile ϕ do α od∧Kiϕ→Committedi ((ϕ?;α);
while ϕ do α od).
The first item of Proposition 7.17 states that commitments are known. The second
item states that a commitment to a sequential composition α1;α2 of actions implies a
commitment to the initial part α1, and that the agent knows that after execution of this initial
part α1 it will be committed to the remainder α2. The third and fourth item formalise the
rationality of agents with regard to their commitments to conditionally composed actions.
The last item concerns the unfolding of a while-loop: if an agent is committed to a while-
loop while knowing the condition of the loop to be true, then the agent is also committed
to the then-part of the while-loop.
Let us give a simple example in which many of our treated terms re-occur.
Example 7.18. Consider an agent Eve living in a blocks world. Blocks may have different
sizes. Here, we assume to have only three formats for real blocks: those of typeA are bigger
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than those of B , which are in turn bigger that those of type C. Block Y can be on top of
blockX (is_on(X,Y )). If there is no such block Y on top ofX, we write is_clear(X).
We distinguish the following atomic actions. Eve can do a drop(X) action, meaning that
X is put on the floor, and she can perform put(X,Y ), which has as an effect that Y is
placed on X. We assume that Eve only has the opportunity of performing a put(X,Y )-
action, if X is clear. She is not able to put heavy blocks: ¬Aeput(X,Y ), for any block Y
of type A. There is no opportunity to put a block X on Y if X > Y , even if Eve is able to
do so. Concerning dropping, she is only able to perform drop(X) if X is clear.
Let us summarise these assumptions in a first-order like language: in fact, this could
also be done in propositional logic. The formula type(X,A) denotes that block X is of
type A. In the following, free variables must be understood to be universally quantified.
The constraints A1,A2, . . . concern Eve’s abilities, O1,O2 . . . are about opportunities, and
the constraints E1,E2 . . . describe the effects of certain actions, whereas the constraints
N1,N2, . . . are concerned with the non-effects of putting and dropping. For instance,
N1 says clear blocks on which no block is put, remain clear. Let us write Oe(α) for
the statement that Eve has the opportunity to do α, i.e., Oe(α) ≡ 〈doe(α)〉>. Finally,
the properties C1,C2, . . . are used to specify additional constraints for our example. In
particular, the axioms C2,C3 and C4 denote that Eve is aware of her goals, abilities and
the results of her actions, respectively. Let i ∈ {e, . . .}.
C1 (type(X,A)∧ type(Y,B) ∧ type(Z,C))→
((X > Y)∧ (Y > Z)∧ (X > Z)).
A1 type(Y,A)↔¬Aiput(X,Y ).
A2 (clear(X)∧¬type(X,A))↔Aidrop(X).
O1 clear(X)∧X 6= Y ∧¬(X < Y)↔Oi (put(X,Y )).
O2 Oidrop(X).
E1 [doi (put(X,Y )](is_on(X,Y )∧¬is_clear(X)).
E2 is_on(X,Y )→[doi (drop(Y ))](is_clear(X)∧ Floor(Y )).
N1 (is_clear(Z)∧Z 6=X)→[doi (put(X,Y ))](is_clear(Z).
N2 (is_on(V ,Z)∧Z 6= Y )→[doi (put(X,Y ))]is_on(V ,Z).
N3 is_on(X,Y )→[doi (drop(Y ))](is_clear(X)∧ Floor(Y )).
N4 (is_on(X,Y )∧ is_on(U,V )∧X 6=U)→[doi (drop(Y ))]is_on(U,V ).
N5 is_clear(Z)→[doi (drop(Y ))]is_clear(Z).
N6 (X = Y ∧U 6= V )→[doi (α)](X = Y ∧U 6= V ).
C2 Goaleϕ→KeGoaleϕ.
C3 Aiα→KeAiα.
C4 〈doe(α)〉ϕ→Ke〈doe(α)〉ϕ.
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On top of these global properties, which remain invariant in our example, we also
have the following minimality principles. To formulate them properly, let us say that the
formulas type(X,A),is_on(X,Y ),is_clear(X),on_floor(X) are all objective
formulas, of which the truth value is determined by some valuation pi (respecting the
dependencies between them, like expressed by (is_on(X,Y )→¬is_clear(X))).
M1 suppose (M′, s′)= 〈S′,pi ′,R′,r′0,c′0,W′,C′,Agenda′〉 ∈ rC(i, a)(M, s).
Then:
if pi 6= pi ′, then a ∈ {put,drop}
if for some ϕ,ψ, (M, s) |= (Wiϕ ∧¬Wiψ), (M′, s′) |= (¬Wiϕ ∨Wiψ),
then a /∈ {put,drop}
if C(i ′, s′) 6= C(i, s), then i ′ 6= i or a ∈ {select ϕ}
if Agenda′(i ′, s′) 6=Agenda(i, s),
then i ′ 6= i or a ∈ {commit_to α,uncommit α}.
M1 expresses that the truth of objective formulas is only affected by putting or dropping
blocks, that putting or dropping blocks does not affect an agent’s wishes, and that the set
of selected wishes or the agenda of agent i can only be altered by agent i itself, and only
by making a choice, or by doing an (un-)commitment, respectively.
Initial state s0. In our initial situation, we have blocks that are situated as in Fig. 1,
determining completely pi(s0). We also have the following initial constraints about Eve’s
selected wishes and agenda:
M2 C(e, s0)= ∅
M3 Agenda(e, s0)= ∅.
Since we only have four blocks here, we can define, for any blocksX1 . . .X4 a predicate
for towers as follows:
C5 tower〈X1,X2,X3,X4〉 ≡
∧
i 6=j
(Xi 6=Xj )∧ Floor(X1)
∧is_on(X1,X2)∧ is_on(X2,X3)
∧is_on(X3,X4)∧ is_clear(X4).
Additionally, let θ denote that tower(X1,X2,X3,X4) is true, for some choice of the
arguments from the blocks A1,B1,B2 and C2. Eve has two wishes: one is to have a tower
(Weθ ) and the other is to have at least four blocks around (Weρ). Since there are in
principle 24 ways to stack the blocks into a tower, these comprise the worlds that are
W -accessible from the initial state s. Determining the goals of Eve, recall that
Goaliϕ
def= Wiϕ ∧¬ϕ ∧ ♦iϕ ∧Ciϕ.
J.-J.Ch. Meyer et al. / Artificial Intelligence 113 (1999) 1–40 29
Fig. 1. The initial block world.
Now, in the initial state s0, we obviously have Weθ ∧ ¬θ . Also, ρ cannot be Eve’s
goal, since it is already fulfilled. This is also the reason that Eve is not able to make
ρ a selected wish. Is she able to select θ? Which of the 24 a priori possibilities of
building towers are implementable for Eve? Due to her (dis-)abilities recorded in the
constraints A1 and A2, and since there is no opportunity to put larger blocks on smaller
ones (O1), there only remain two options: one is tower(A1,B1,B2,C2), and the other is
tower(A1,B2,B1,C2). To see why θ is implementable by Eve, let us consider the plan
α = drop(C2);put(B1,B2);put(B2,C2).
We will also write α as a1;a2;a3. We have to check whether in s0, for our particular α
and θ , PracPosse(α, θ) holds. This boils down to checking both 〈doe(α)〉θ and Aeα in the
initial state, which is an immediate consequence from the properties A1,A2,O1,O2,E1
and E2, applied to the initial configuration. Hence, we have ♦eθ . For θ to become a goal,
Eve has to select it from her wishes. By usingC3 andC4, we derive that KePracPosse(α, θ)
holds in s0, i.e., Cane(α, θ). In particular, this implies that Eve is able to choose θ . Let us
assume Eve makes this choice, i.e., that she selects θ .
The next state s1. Now, assuming that Eve made the choice θ , by the definition of the
result of selecting (Definition 6.2), we know that s1 only differs from s0 in the set of
selected wishes C(e, s1) ascribed to s1. Thus, in s1, like in s0, we have Goaleθ , and, by
property C2, KeGoaleθ . Thus, we have Cane(α, θ) ∧ KeGoaleθ , which, by definition,
entails PossIntende(α, θ). This, in its turn, implies that Eve has the opportunity to commit
to the action α to fulfil her goal. Since we know from the constraintsM3 andM1 that Eve’s
agenda is empty in s1, Eve is also able to commit to α. Let us suppose that Eve decides to
commit to the action α resulting in a state s2.
The next state s2. Now, Agenda(e, s2) = {α}. Let s21, s22 and s23 be as follows: 〈α, s2〉
⇀e,a1 〈(a2;a3), s21〉 ⇀e,a2 〈a3, s22〉 ⇀e,a3 〈Λ,s23〉. Thus, we have Agenda(e, s21) ={a2;a3} and Agenda(e, s22)= {a3} (under the assumption M3).
As an effect, in s2, Eve is committed to the actions a1, a1;a2 and a1;a2;a3, yielding,
among others, Committede(a1;a2;a3). Similar commitments hold for the states s2i . Since
the act of committing only influences the contents of the agenda, we have in s2, as in s1,
that KeGoaleθ ∧ PossIntende(α, θ). Let us now suppose that Eve executes a1, i.e., she
drops C2 on the floor.
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The state s3. Here, by constraint E2, is_clear(B2) holds. Also, by M1, Eve is still
committed to a2 and a2;a3. Hence, in principle, she can decide to perform a2, possibly
followed by a3. Is θ still a goal? First of all, since the block B2 is clear now, we have
¬θ . Moreover, by constraint M1, we still have Ceθ ∧Weθ , in s3. Since the constraint
N5 on non-effects guarantees that dropping block C2 does not affect is_clear(B2),
one readily checks that we also have PracPosse(a2;a3, θ) so that, by usingM1, we indeed
conclude Goaliθ , in s3. We can use constraintsC3 and C4 to conclude Ke(〈doe(a2;a3)〉θ ∧
Ae(a2;a3)), giving Cane(a2;a3, θ), so that, indeed, we have PossIntende(a2;a3, θ). This
implies that Eve has an opportunity to commit to doing a2;a3, but, since her agenda is
already filled (with a2;a3), she is not able to commit again.
Of course, Eve can decide to execute a2 now, leading her to state s4. In a similar line of
reasoning as above, she then can decide to perform a3, leading her to a state s5 in which
her goal θ is fulfilled and, hence, will not be one of Eve’s goals anymore.
Note how, to ensure that Eve’s goal θ did persist while moving to state s3, we had to
use several persistence and non-effects assumptions. This seems reasonable: goals persist
during execution of a plan to fulfil them, unless unexpected side-effects of actions occur.
In our example, we ruled out the possible side-effects that may prevent θ to remain a goal
while doing a1, but in general, it may be too hard to sum up all these possible non-effects,
and, moreover, one cannot always guarantee that they will not occur. In other words, we
do not want to advocate a general property like
KiGoaliϕ→[doi (α)]KiGoaliϕ. (1)
First of all, if (1) would be valid, then goals would never be achieved! Of course, to
overcome this, we might weaken (1) to KiGoaliϕ→[doi (α)](KiGoaliϕ∨ϕ), but another
problem with (1) is that it does not link α to ways to achieve the goal: α may be a step in
the ‘wrong’ direction for achieving ϕ, destroying the conditions constituting ϕ as a goal.
Hence, a better way to guarantee persistence of goals might be the following:
(PossIntendi (α;β,ϕ)∧Committediα;β)→
〈doi (α)〉(PossIntendi (β,ϕ)∨ ϕ) (2)
expressing that an intention, to which a commitment has been made, persists while execut-
ing the initial part of a plan to achieve it, unless it is achieved already. Property (2) does
not hold in our framework: from PossIntendi (α;β,ϕ) one can derive Ki(〈doi (α;β〉ϕ ∧
Ai (α;β)) ∧ KiGoaliϕ, which, in case α is deterministic, entails Ki〈doi (α〉(〈doi (β〉ϕ ∧
Aiβ) ∧KiGoaliϕ, but in our framework we do not guarantee that this knowledge of the
effect of doing α remains there after α has been done. We believe that this is as it should be.
8. Summary and conclusions
In this paper we presented a formalisation of motivational attitudes, the attitudes that
explain why agents act the way they do. This formalisation concerns operators both on the
assertion level, where operators range over propositions, and on the practition level, where
operators range over actions. An important feature of our formalisation is the attention
paid to the acts associated with selecting between wishes and with (un)committing to
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actions. Starting from the primitive notion of wishes, we defined goals to be selected,
unfulfilled, implementable wishes. Commitments may be made to actions that are known
to be correct and feasible with respect to some goal and may be undone whenever the action
to which an agent has committed itself has either become impossible or useless. Both the
act of making, and the act of undoing commitments are formalised as model-transforming
actions in our framework. The actions that an agent is committed to are recorded in its
agenda in such a way that commitments are closed under prefix-taking and under practical
identity, i.e., having identical computation runs. On the whole our formalisation is a rather
expressive one, which tries to be faithful to a certain extent to both commonsense intuition
and philosophical insights.
8.1. Future work
A first obvious extension would be to allow the agent (via the capability function) to put
multiple actions (commitments) in its agenda. Of course, this would also call for a selection
mechanism (sometimes called arbitration) for choosing committed actions to be executed
in the line of the work of Bratman et al. [5] on the selection of plans.
A further, related extension to the framework presented here concerns a formalisation of
the actual execution of actions. Although the conditional nature of a framework based on
dynamic logic makes it perhaps less suitable for an adequate formalisation of ‘doing’,
one could think of a practition operator indicating which action is actually performed
next. Using this predicate would enhance expressiveness in that it would be possible to
formulate relations between actions that agents are committed to, and actions that they
actually perform.
Another way to extend the framework would be by establishing further relations with
deontic notions like obligations and violations. A combination of the ‘doing’-predicate
with a deontic notion modelling violations or penalties would then allow one to model that
agents should execute the actions that they are committed to if they want to avoid penalties.
Research along these lines was initiated by Dignum and Van Linder [10,11].
A very important extension that we will pursue is the extension to deal with multi-agent
systems properly. In this case the agent’s agenda should also contain some means to refer
to (actions of) other agents, for instance requests for information or requests/commands for
other agents to perform actions. At the moment we are looking at communicative aspects
of agents expressed in agent (programming) languages [58,59], in which primitives for
requesting and sending information are incorporated. It will be interesting to see how
this experience can help us to give proper models (together with a logical specification
language) for this crucial aspect.
Furthermore, we will investigate how the model as presented may serve as a rigorous
semantic framework for agent-oriented languages such as AGENT0 [54], PLACA [57],
and AgentSpeak(L) [45], so that, based on this model, specification methods for programs
written in these languages can be obtained. A first step in this direction is the definition of
the ‘abstract’ agent language 3APL [22], which on the one hand can be easily related
to these other languages and, on the other hand, has programming constructs of the
form pi ← ϕ | pi ′, which, in our present terminology, express ‘agenda maintenance’: in a
situation where ϕ holds, the agent may replace pi by pi ′ in its agenda of commitments.
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In case pi ′ is empty, such a rule expresses the possibility of dropping a commitment
(performance of an uncommitment) under certain circumstances (indicated by ϕ). In 3APL
we have also considered rule (plan) selection and execution mechanisms, clearly related
to the issues mentioned before. We plan to investigate the use of the logical formalism
presented in this paper to specify agents written in the language 3APL.
8.2. Related work
The formalisation of motivational attitudes has received much attention within the agent
research community. Probably the most influential account of motivational attitudes in
AI is due to Cohen and Levesque [9], inspired by the conceptual groundwork of the
philosopher M.E. Bratman [4]. Starting from the primitive notions of implicit goals and
beliefs, Cohen and Levesque define so-called persistent goals, which are goals which
agents give up only when they think they are either satisfied or will never be true, and
intentions, both ranging over propositions and over actions. The idea underlying persistent
goals is similar to that underlying our notion of goals. In the framework of Cohen and
Levesque agents intend to bring about a proposition if they intend to do some action that
brings about the proposition. An agent intends to do an action if it has the persistent goal to
have done the action. This reduction of intentions to do actions for goals is a rather artificial
and philosophically very questionable one: although intentions to actions should be related
to goals, this relation should express that doing the action helps in bringing about some
goal and not that doing the action in itself is a goal. Furthermore the coexistence of goals
and intentions ranging over propositions seems to complicate matters unnecessarily.
As compared to the approach of Cohen and Levesque, we claim that our approach is
more ‘computational’ in nature. At the basis of our theory we employ dynamic logic,
a programming logic with explicit reference to actions (programs) within the language.
Intentions are represented by commitments that have a very computational flavour,
consisting of actions, and we employ concepts (like transition systems) from the realm
of the semantics of programming.
Another important formalisation of motivational attitudes is proposed by Rao and
Georgeff [47] by means of their BDI-logic(s). Treating desires and intentions as primitive,
Rao and Georgeff focus on the process of intention revision rather than the ‘commitment
acquisition’ which is essential to our formalisation. Another major difference is that BDI-
logic rests on temporal logic rather than dynamic logic as in the case of our KARO-
framework. Both desires and intentions in their framework suffer from the problems
associated with logical omniscience. To avoid these problems, Cavedon et al. [8] propose
the use of non-normal logics of intention and belief in the BDI-logic, and more in particular
Rantala’s ‘impossible worlds’ framework [44]. This ‘impossible worlds’ approach was
originally proposed as a way to solve the problems of logical omniscience for informational
attitudes. Hence, whereas we more or less employ the awareness approach, Cavedon et al.
propose yet another technique developed to solve the problems of logical omniscience.
It therefore may come as no surprise that the properties that Cavedon et al. acquire for
intentions are highly similar to the properties of goals given in Section 6.
Recently Rao and Georgeff [19] have also considered the dynamics of BDI-notions.
Although they, of course, employ their BDI-logic to discuss the maintenance of beliefs,
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desires and intentions, this work is very close in spirit to ours. Focusing on intention
maintenance we observe a very important difference, though. In [19] Rao and Georgeff
mention the problem of logical omniscience again, which in the dynamic setting appears
to have even graver consequences. For instance, if one intends ϕ, then if one uses a
normal modal logic for intentions (such as Rao and Georgeff’s BDI-logic), one obtains
also that one intends ϕ ∨ ψ , for arbitrary ψ . However, if intention ϕ is now dropped due
to some reason (e.g., because it is not attainable for the agent), this will result (under some
reasonable assumption of minimal change) in the intention of ψ , which is rather absurd!
In order to solve this problem Rao and Georgeff introduce an “only intends” operator in
a similar vein as Levesque’s “only knows” operator [30]. However, in our framework we
work with commitment (agenda) maintenance where actions are maintained or modified
(by means of a commit_toα operator) rather than assertions. In our set-up we thus do
no have a problem with logical omniscience regarding the maintenance of commitments.
Recording actions in one’s agenda and reasoning about these has a very different logic
than doing the same for assertions, or put more concisely, the logic of commit_toα is
completely different from that of intend as in BDI-logic, and does not suffer from the
logical omniscience problem. 19
We also like to mention here the work by Singh [55], which bears some resemblance to
our approach. It also considers intended actions and provides a calculus to ‘maintain the
agent’s agenda’. The main difference is again that his theory rests on temporal branching-
time logic. (He also has some constructs à la dynamic logic in his language, but these,
too, have an explicit temporal interpretation.) Furthermore, the emphasis in his work is put
on exploring the intricacies of intentional notions as related to issues of nondeterminism,
which we have not considered in this paper at all.
The last formalisation of motivational attitudes that we would like to mention is the one
proposed by Dignum et al. [12]. In this formalisation, which is inspired by and based
on research on deontic logic as carried out by Dignum et al., notions like decisions,
intentions and commitments are modelled. Of these, decisions and the act of committing
are interpreted as so-called meta-actions, a notion similar to that of model-transformers.
Despite its complexity, which is due to the incorporation of an algebraic semantics of
actions and a trace semantics to model histories, some of the essential ideas underlying the
formalisation of Dignum et al. are not unlike those underlying the formalisation presented
here.
Appendix A. Selected proofs
Proposition 5.3. All of the properties of logical omniscience formalised in Definition 5.2,
with the exception of LO7, are valid for the Wi operator.
Proof. Properties LO1 and LO2 state that Wi is a normal modal operator and are shown
as for any necessity operator. Property LO3 follows directly by combining LO1 and LO2,
19 In deontic logic, the logic of obligation and prohibition, one encounters a similar distinction with respect to,
e.g., the obligation operator: such an obligation operator with an action as argument (‘ought-to-do’) follows a
entirely different logic than one with an assertion as argument (‘ought-to-be’), cf. [39].
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and LO4 is a direct consequence of LO3. Properties LO5 and LO6 are typical for necessity
operators in a normal modal logic: for whenever both ϕ and ψ hold at a set of designated
worlds, ϕ ∧ψ also holds at all the worlds from that set (LO5), and if ϕ holds at all worlds
from some set then ϕ ∨ ψ does also (LO6). That LO7 is not valid for the Wi operator is
seen by considering a model M with state s such that no state s′ exists with (s, s′) ∈W(i).
Then it holds that M, s |=C Wiϕ ∧Wi¬ϕ, for all ϕ ∈ L. 2
Proposition 6.7. None of the properties of logical omniscience formalised in Defini-
tion 5.2, with the exception of LO7, is valid for the Goali operator.
Proof. Properties LO1, LO3, LO4, LO5 and LO6 are most easily seen not to hold for the
goal operator by noting the absence of any closure properties on the set C(i, s), for i ∈ A
and s some state. Due to this absence it is perfectly possible that ϕ and ϕ→ ψ are both
in C(i, s) while ψ is not (LO1), that ϕ ∈ C(i, s) and ψ /∈ C(i, s) while |=C ϕ→ ψ (LO3)
or |=C ϕ↔ ψ (LO4), that {ϕ,ψ} ⊆ C(i, s) and ϕ ∧ψ /∈ C(i, s) (LO5), or that ϕ ∈ C(i, s)
while ϕ ∨ψ /∈ C(i, s) (LO6), for appropriate i ∈A and s a state in some model. Property
LO2 is seen not to hold by observing that |=C ϕ implies that ϕ is fulfilled always and
everywhere, which means that ϕ is not a goal. In fact, one can show that whenever ϕ
is inevitable, i.e., |=C ϕ holds, it is necessarily not a goal, i.e., |=C ¬Goaliϕ holds (cf.
item (5) of Proposition 6.8). That LO7 holds for goals is a direct consequence of their
unfulfilledness. For in any possible state s of any possible model M, either ϕ holds and
thereby M, s 6|=C Goaliϕ, or ¬ϕ holds and thereby M, s 6|=C Goali¬ϕ. Hence LO7 is a
valid property for goals. 2
Proposition 6.8. For all i ∈A and ϕ ∈ L we have:
(1) |=C Wiϕ↔〈doi (selectϕ)〉>.
(2) |=C 〈doi (selectϕ)〉>↔ 〈doi (selectϕ)〉Ciϕ.
(3) |=C ¬Aiselectϕ→[doi (selectϕ)]¬Goaliϕ.
(4) |=C PracPossi (selectϕ,>)↔〈doi (selectϕ)〉Goaliϕ.
(5) |=C ϕ⇒|=C ¬Goaliϕ.
(6) (ϕ→ψ)→ (Goaliϕ→Goaliψ) is not for all ϕ,ψ ∈ L valid.
(7) Ki (ϕ→ψ)→ (Goaliϕ→Goaliψ) is not for all ϕ,ψ ∈ L valid.
Proof. We successively show all items. Let M ∈MC with state s and ϕ ∈ L be arbitrary.
(1) An easy inspection of Definition 6.2 shows that
rC(i,selectϕ)(M, s)= ∅
iff M, s 6|=C Wiϕ. Thus M, s |=C Wiϕ ↔ 〈doi (selectϕ)〉>, which was to be
shown.
(2) If M′, s = rC(i,selectϕ)(M, s), then M′ is such that C′(i, s) contains ϕ. Then
by definition M′, s |=C Ciϕ, and thus M, s |=C 〈doi (selectϕ)〉Ciϕ if M, s |=C
〈doi (selectϕ)〉>, which suffices to conclude item (2).
(3) Suppose M, s |=C ¬Aiselectϕ, i.e., M, s |=C ϕ ∨ ¬♦iϕ. Now by definition,
ϕ ∈ L, and hence, by Proposition 6.4, M′, s |=C ϕ if M, s |=C ϕ whenever M′, s =
rC(i,selectϕ)(M, s). By Corollary 6.5 it follows that for M′ as aforementioned
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holds that M′, s |=C ¬♦iϕ if M, s |=C ¬♦iϕ. Thus if M, s |=C ϕ ∨ ¬♦iϕ then it
holds for M′, s = rC(i,selectϕ)(M, s) that M′, s |=C ϕ ∨¬♦iϕ. By definition it
then directly follows that M′, s |=C ¬Goaliϕ, and thus
M, s |=C ¬Aiselectϕ→[doi (selectϕ)]¬Goaliϕ,
which was to be shown.
(4) This item follows by combining item (2) of this proposition with Proposition 6.4
and Corollary 6.5.
(5) If |=C ϕ holds, then M, s |=C ϕ for all M ∈ MC with state s. Hence M, s |=C
¬Goaliϕ for all M ∈MC and their states s, and thus |=C ¬Goaliϕ.
(6) This item is easily shown by selecting an appropriate contingency ϕ and an arbitrary
tautology ψ , such that for certain M and s holds that M, s |=C Goaliϕ. For then
M, s |=C (ϕ→ψ)∧Goaliϕ while—by the previous item—M, s 6|=C Goaliψ .
(7) Item (7) is proved similarly to item (6). 2
Proposition 7.16. For all i ∈A, α,β ∈Ac and ϕ ∈ L we have:
(1) |=C PossIntendi (α,ϕ)→〈doi (commit_toα)〉>.
(2) |=C 〈doi (commit_toα)〉>↔ 〈doi (commit_toα)〉Committediα.
(3) |=C Committediα→¬Aicommit_toβ .
(4) |=C [doi (commit_toα)]¬Aicommit_toβ .
(5) |=C Committediα↔〈doi (uncommitα)〉¬Committediα.
(6) |=C PossIntendi (α,ϕ)→¬Aiuncommitα.
(7) |=C (Ciϕ↔KiCiϕ)→ (Aiuncommitα↔KiAiuncommitα).
(8) |=C Committediα ∧¬Cani (α,>)→Cani (uncommitα,¬Committediα).
Proof. We show the second, third, fourth, seventh and eight item; the other ones follow
directly from the respective definitions. Let M ∈MC with state s, and i ∈A, α,β ∈Ac be
arbitrary.
(2) Let M, s |=C 〈doi (commit_toα)〉> and let
M′, s = rC(i,commit_toα)(M, s).
We have to show that M′, s |=C Committediα, i.e., we have to show that
∀s′ ∈ [s]R′(i) ∃α1 ∈ CRCM′(i, α, s′)∃α2 ∈Agenda′(i, s′)
∃α′2 ∈ CRCM(i, α2, s′)(Prefix(α1), α′2)).
An inspection of Definition 7.9 shows that for all s′ ∈ [s]R(i) = [s]R′(i) holds that
Agenda′(i, s′) contains α. This implies that M′, s |=C Committediα. Thus
M, s |=C 〈doi (commit_toα)〉Committediα,
which suffices to conclude that item (2) holds.
(3) If M, s |=C Committediα then, by Definition 7.12, we have that Agenda(i, s) 6= ∅.
Hence, by Definition 7.9, M, s |=C ¬Aicommit_toβ .
(4) If rC(i,commit_toα)(M, s)= ∅ then
M, s |=C [doi (commit_toα)]¬Aicommit_toβ
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is trivially true. Else M, s |=C 〈doi (commit_toα)〉Committediα by item (2)
of this proposition, and, by item (3), this implies M, s |=C 〈doi (commit_toα)〉
¬Aicommit_toβ , which suffices to conclude item (4).
(7) Suppose M, s |=C Ciϕ↔ KiCiϕ and M, s |=C Aiuncommitα. This implies that
M, s |=C ¬PossIntendi (α,ϕ), for all ϕ ∈ C(i, s). That is, M, s |=C ¬Cani (α,ϕ) ∨
¬KiGoaliϕ for all ϕ ∈ C(i, s). But by the introspective properties of knowledge
the latter implies that M, s |=C Ki¬Cani (α,ϕ)∨Ki¬KiGoaliϕ, for all ϕ ∈ C(i, s).
Hence M, s |=C Ki (¬Cani (α,ϕ)∨¬KiGoaliϕ), for all ϕ ∈ C(i, s), and thus for all
s′ ∈ [s]R(i) it holds that M, s′ |=C ¬PossIntendi (α,ϕ) for all ϕ ∈ C(i, s), i.e., for all
ϕ such that M, s |=C Ciϕ. By the assumption M, s |=C Ciϕ↔ KiCiϕ, we obtain
that M, s′ |=C ¬PossIntendi (α,ϕ) for all ϕ such that M, s |=C KiCiϕ, i.e., for
all ϕ ∈ C(i, s′) for all s′ ∈ [s]R(i). Consequently, M, s′ |=C Aiuncommitα. Thus
M, s |=C KiAiuncommitα, which suffices to conclude that item (7) indeed holds.
(8) Suppose M, s |=C Committediα ∧ ¬Cani (α,>). Then M, s |=C ¬Cani (α,ϕ) for
all ϕ ∈ L, and thus M, s |=C ¬PossIntendi (α,ϕ) for all ϕ ∈ C(i, s). Then, by
definition of cC, M, s |=C Aiuncommitα, and, by the previous item, M, s |=C
KiAiuncommitα. Also, M, s |=C Committediα implies
M, s |=C KiCommittediα
by Proposition 7.17(1), and, by item (5) of this proposition, M, s |=C Ki〈doi
(uncommitα)〉¬Committediα. Thus
M, s |=C Ki〈doi (uncommitα)〉¬Committediα ∧KiAiuncommitα.
This implies that M, s |=C Cani (uncommitα,¬Committediα), which suffices to
conclude item (8). 2
Proposition 7.17. For all i ∈A, α,α1, α2 ∈Ac and all ϕ ∈ L we have:
(1) |=C Committediα→KiCommittediα.
(2) |=C Committedi (α1;α2)→Committediα1 ∧Ki[doi (α1)]Committediα2.
(3) |=C Committediif ϕ then α1 else α2 fi∧Kiϕ→Committedi (ϕ?;α1).
(4) |=C Committediif ϕ then α1 else α2 fi∧Ki¬ϕ→Committedi (¬ϕ?;α2).
(5) |=C Committediwhile ϕ do α od∧Kiϕ→Committedi ((ϕ?;α);
while ϕ do α od).
Proof. We successively show all items. Let M ∈MC with state s and ϕ ∈ L, α,α1, α2 ∈Ac
be arbitrary.
(1) Assume that M, s |=C Committediα. By Definition 7.12 it then follows that
∀s′ ∈ [s]R(i) ∃α1 ∈ CRCM(i, α, s′)∃α2 ∈Agenda(i, s′)∃α′2
∃α′2 ∈ CRCM(i, α2, s′)(Prefix(α1, α′2)).
Since [s]R(i) is an equivalence class we have that
∀s′′ ∈ [s]R(i) ∀s′ ∈ [s′′]R(i) ∃α1 ∈ CRCM(i, α, s′)∃α2 ∈Agenda(i, s′)
∃α′2 ∈ CRCM(i, α2, s′)(Prefix(α1, α′2)),
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which implies M, s′′ |=C Committediα for all s′′ ∈ [s]R(i), and thus M, s |=C
KiCommittediα.
(2) Let
M, s |=C Committediα1;α2,
i.e., for all s′ ∈ [s]R(i) some β1 ∈ CRCM(i, α1;α2, s′), β2 ∈ Agenda(i, s′) and β ′2 ∈
CRCM(i, β2, s′) exist such that Prefix(β1, β ′2) holds. But then also for all s′ ∈ [s]R(i)
some γ1 ∈ CRCM(i, α1, s′), γ2 ∈ Agenda(i, s′) and γ ′2 ∈ CRCM(i, γ2, s′) exist such
that Prefix(γ1, γ ′2) holds (viz. γ2 = β2 and γ ′2 = β ′2 satisfy the requirement, since
Prefix(β1, γ1)). Thus M, s |=C Committediα1.
Furthermore, consider some state s′ ∈ [s]R(i) and some state s′′ ∈ rC(i, α1)(M, s′).
By the above we obtain that there exist some β1 ∈ CRCM(i, α1;α2, s′), β2 ∈
Agenda(i, s′) and β ′2 ∈ CRCM(i, β2, s′) exist such that Prefix(β1, β ′2) holds. By
Proposition 7.3 we have that CRCM(i, β1, s′)= CRCM(i, α1, s′);CRCM(i, α2, s′′). Sup-
pose CRCM(i, α1, s′) = {b1;b2; . . . ;bm}. Since CRCM(i, β2, s′) = CRCM(i, α1;α2, s′);
γ = CRCM(i, α1, s′);CRCM(i, α2, s′′);γ = b1;b2; . . . ;bm;CRCM(i, α2, s′′);γ , for
some γ ∈ Acseq, we have by Proposition 7.5 that 〈s′, β2〉⇀b1 · · ·⇀bm 〈s′′, δ2〉,
with δ2 such that CRCM(i, δ2, s′′) = CRCM(i, α2, s′′);γ . This implies that δ2 ∈
Agenda(i, s′′′) for all s′′′ ∈ [s′′]R(i). Thus we have that, for all s′′′ ∈ [s′′]R(i), there
exist δ1 ∈ CRCM(i, α2, s′′′), δ2 ∈ Agenda(i, s′′′) and δ′2 ∈ CRCM(i, δ2, s′′′) such that
Prefix(δ1, δ′2).
(3) Assume that M, s |=C Committediif ϕ then α1 else α2 fi∧Kiϕ. By definition
of CRCM and CS we have
CRCM(i,if ϕ then α1 else α2 fi, s′)= CRCM(i, ϕ?;α1, s′)
for all s′ ∈ [s]R(i). Hence it follows that
∃β1 ∈ CRCM(i,if ϕ then α1 else α2 fi, s′)∃β2 ∈Agenda(i, s′)
∃β ′2 ∈ CRCM(i, β2, s′)(Prefix(β1, β ′2))
implies
∃β1 ∈ CRCM(i, (ϕ?;α1), s′)∃β2 ∈Agenda(i, s′)
∃β ′2 ∈ CRCM(i, β2, s′)(Prefix(β1, β ′2))
for all s′ ∈ [s]R(i). Then it is indeed the case that from
M, s |=C Committediif ϕ then α1 else α2 fi
it follows that M, s |=C Committedi (ϕ?;α1), which suffices to conclude this item.
(4) This item is completely analogous to the previous one.
(5) From the definition of CRCM and CS it follows that in the case that M, s |=C ϕ,
CRCM(i,while ϕ do α od, s)= CRCM(i, (ϕ?;α);while ϕ do α od, s).
By a similar argument as the one given in the proof of item (3) one concludes that
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M, s |=C Committediwhile ϕ do α od∧Kiϕ→
Committedi ((ϕ?;α);while ϕ do α od),
which concludes item (5). 2
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